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THE POLITICAL SITUATION 
whole world is waiting to  see the development of THE a stable government in China. This interest is 
doubtless in some measure a practical one, for the reason 
that only a stable national organization can be prosperous 
and so provide the mutual benefits that flow from trade. 
But this expectant interest has much more than a material 
basis. Here  is the last of the great nations effecting politi- 
cal changes that in other countries have become history. 
T h e  mere spectacle of a quarter of the world’s population 
undertaking a fundamental reorganization of its national 
life is as impressive as the formation or disintegration of 
an ancient empire. I t  does not mean the ascendancy of a 
barbarian horde, spreading out a feudal fabric unified by 
a monarchy and gradually extending political privileges to  
the people. This is a population nearly homogeneous in type 
and of the highest level of civilization, solidified by a cul- 
ture of unbroken continuity through three thousand years. 
I t  is not an assembly of diverse fragments held together 
by iron bands of authority. I t  is a people on whom govern- 
ment has always rested lightly, and who have drawn their 
power of cohesion from other than political sources. 
A few years ago this stupendous body suddenly dropped 
the political cloak it had always worn and began to  try on 
another o f  Western fabrication. I t  seemed a simple matter 
to take well tried political forms and fit them together into 
the required garment. But it proved too strange and 
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cramped for the giant, who could not forget his inefficient 
and often clumsy, but always decorative and lightly worn, 
habiliments. Now the whole construction is a mass of rags. 
China is still furiously thrashing about in naked confusion. 
Most 
states have been formed after conquest when reorganization 
proceeded with the definiteness of a single will and the cer- 
tainty of overwhelming force. I t  always seems that with 
a successful disruption of the controlling power, the pro- 
cesses of reconstruction would be as easy, as simple, and 
as successful. But this is never so. A revolution is always 
a phase of domestic political development. I t  is a type of 
reaction which, i f  it is anything more than a substitution 
of one tyranny for another, is effected by the profounder 
forces of a people’s life. T h e  phase of violence is only the 
breaking crest of a great wave. T h e  French Revolution 
occupied two centuries rather than the short decade of its 
dramatic expression. Western political history during the 
nineteenth century was the reality of the French Revolution. 
But the leaders and supporters of a disruptive movement 
have the fullest expectation that it will suddenly achieve 
that ideal statehood which they so ardently desire. I t  al- 
ways seems that i f  we could only be released from our 
bonds, we could instantly soar to  divine heights. This  is 
the delusion of freedom. In  practice and in fact, conduct, 
unless held under extraordinary constraint, remains the 
same whether under bondage or under freedom. If all 
married people with a sense of being tied to  each other 
could be magically released, nearly all would be re-married 
to  the same persons within a month. Life is lived as an 
expression of its own forces flowing through channels which 
the years have fixed and deepened. Bondage is simply a 
feeling of constraint, and freedom a feeling of choice, each 
T o o  much is always expected of a revolution. 
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attached to  the same act which derives from entirely other 
causes. Organized life is a con- 
struction of many thousands of years of slow adjustment. 
I t  is built into the very tissue of every new generation. 
Men  d o  things in certain ways just as they walk, because 
they have command of no other way. 
I t  follows that if  a wave of political change touches the 
depths of a people’s life, which means its habits, customs, 
usages, attitudes, and values, it is in contact with something 
as solid as a rockbound shore against which the waters 
waste their strength. A careful study of revolutionary 
movements shows that when the flood recedes there has been 
perhaps a superficial scouring, but the essential topography 
of the people’s life emerges unchanged. 
If this is true of revolutions in general, it is doubly true 
of one in China. For  in that country political life and 
social life have never intermingled. T h e  empire main- 
tained itself because it never interfered with the structure 
and operations of Chinese society. T h e  government was 
of course always present, like the weather, something that 
might cause inconvenience, but had to  be tolerated and 
whose taxes had t o  be paid. But it amounted to  very little 
more. T h e  conduct of the people with all its interlinking 
relationships moved with independence. At the present 
moment, when the only kind of government known in China 
is of one type, varying from a bandit chief with a handful 
of armed ruffians, extorting his living from a village, to  the 
war lord extorting his living from a group of provinces, the 
life of the Chinese goes on as it has done for  thousands of 
years, with its own terms of cohesion and its own control 
of conduct. If the whole military and governmental 
mechanism should be swept away overnight, China would 
So it is with a people. 
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simply breathe a great sigh of relief and go on exactly 
as before. 
Into this situation have been injected a multitude of ideas 
and forms brought back by students of political institutions 
in the West, and all of us Westerners, because these ideas 
and forms seem to  us normal, imagine that they can be 
speedily and successfully applied to  Chinese society. Fo r  
example the new code enacted by the Republic is a transcript 
of the Napoleonic code with Prussian emendations. This 
is presented for acceptance to  a people who adjust their 
relationships and settle their differences in terms of im- 
memorial custom. A moment’s reflection on the growth of 
a legal system makes it obvious that the Chinese will have a 
code only after decades of drawing regulations and rules 
out of their own usages. T h e  constitutions proposed are 
copies taken from the most highly evolved charters of 
self-government found in the West. These are presented 
for acceptance to  a people to  whom legislative functions 
are as strange as i f  they had just arrived from a distant 
planet. 
I t  was inevitable that the change in China should be 
initiated and engineered by those who had most completely 
inoculated themselves with Western thought, that is, the 
returned students. T h e  Chinese, searching in our univer- 
sities and communities for the technical secrets of our ma- 
terial success, could not fail to  be impressed by our forms 
of political organization. Indeed the interest of an oriental 
student is apparently attracted more easily to  the fields of 
politics and economics than to  any other. I t  was obvious 
that the West  excelled under a republican organization, and 
so a republic seemed the device which the patriotic Chinese 
should understand and transfer to  his own homeland. Not  
this only, but an ultra-modern political philosophy showed 
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how republics could be improved in a direction which 
seemed still more beneficial t o  the mass of the people, the 
direction of socialism. Since a great majority of the stu- 
dents came from Canton it is easily comprehended that upon 
their return they should produce an atmosphere which, 
however foreign to  the genius of China, provided for them 
what appeared to  be the final expression of Western thought. 
The re  was nothing unhealthy in this except for the fact that 
it had no corrective in the criticism of other thinkers and 
of practical men. 
T h e  returned student was slowly incorporated into the 
administration, but still as a subordinate to  the old type of 
official. I t  is not certain that he could have secured any 
greater influence ha.d it not been for the continuous heavy 
pressure from the outside during the first years of the cen- 
tury. T o  westernize or be destroyed was the dilemma 
confronting the dynasty. T h e  decision was finally taken, 
the traditional examinations were discontinued, and the 
empire witnessed the most momentous of all revolutionary 
changes, the fall of the mandarinate. 
T o  appreciate the significance of this step one must recall 
that the system dated back to  the legendary days of 
the founding of the empire, when the families provided the 
emperor with their ablest sons to  assist him in the work of 
government. In  course of time the examinations were 
standardized into the most exacting tests t o  which the 
human mind could be subjected, and the reward of high 
office fell only to  those able to  pass. W e  of the West  have 
been accustomed to  ridicule the Chinese training in the 
classics and capacity to  write perfect essays, as qualifying 
for  the practical duties of administration. Our  schools 
for such training place a minimum of value upon literary 
ability. 
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This, however, is t o  misconceive the significance of the 
mandarin class in China. Administration there was a dif- 
ferent sort of thing, involving only a few of the capacities 
needed by western officials. T h e  country lives and works 
under an established custom economy. Relationships are 
defined as the result of ancient experiment and adjustment. 
Conduct contains its own guiding principle. Any question 
of right turns upon conformity to  usage. Transgressors 
are few and such disputes as arise can be decided by the 
wiser heads of families o r  those charged with the conduct 
and welfare of the guilds. A dispute that reached the 
yamen had, so to speak, already passed beyond the proper 
field of Chinese adjudication. It was somewhat as if dis- 
putants refused all measures of mediation and settlement 
and carried the fight t o  the limits of outlawry. An official 
trial was therefore never understood to  be other than a 
continuation of the struggle in which each side made a bid 
fo r  official help. 
In  the presence of a system of this kind in which ethical 
principle is all dominant, and law means nothing more than 
sporadic imperial edicts, it is reasonable that the best official 
is one who is an able exponent of the principles of conduct. 
And if these principles have been elevated to  the status of 
a beautiful literature, then obviously the most influential 
official would be he who could add to  the strength of this 
commendation. Chinese history presents a long, unbroken 
road for the simple reason that control of conduct by an 
ethical system has never been disrupted. 
T h e  fall of the mandarins meant the ascendancy of the 
returned students, and in their train that larger group pro- 
duced by the westernized schools of Japan and of China 
herself, provided with a smattering of knowledge, part  
T h e  highest bidder usually won, 
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Oriental and par t  Western, ill-assorted and undigested. I t  
was in this medium, especially in the south, that the idea 
of a republic gained adherents, grew and flourished. 
After the death of the old Empress it was impossible for 
her weak successors t o  retain sufficient power to  uphold 
the Manchu rule. T h e  stronger adherents had been af- 
fronted o r  retired through fear of their influence, and so 
the dynasty, relying only upon the weak, tottered to  its fall. 
Revolution broke out in 191 1 on the Yangtse, and quickly 
spread through the central provinces. I t  was not a t  first 
conceived to  be other than anti-dynastic but was quickly 
seized and dominated by the republicans under the con- 
summately skillful leadership of W u  T ing  Fang. T o  this 
able representative of the old official class belongs the credit 
of having guided the first and most difficult steps of the 
revolution into a movement to  end the imperial order in 
China for all time. T h e  more spectacular Sun Yat  Sen, 
who had  been publicity and financial agent, but who 
possessed no administrative ability and little capacity for 
leadership, has been raised to  the pedestal as the hero of 
the Revolution. 
T h e  republican provincial government established in Nan- 
king, the ancient southern capital, had still to  face the more 
conservative north, now dominated and led by the ablest 
man China has known in this century, Yuan Shi Kai, re- 
called into service by the throne as premier of the kingdom 
and head of the army. I t  is well known that Yuan effected 
what amounted to  a betrayal of the dynasty after prolonged 
negotiations with Nanking, that under carefully perfected 
face-saving arrangements he secured the abdication of the 
monarch, and for this service became provisional president 
of the Chinese republic. T h e  bargain made by the repub- 
licans seemed fully justified, for the new president quickly 
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obtained recognition by foreign nations and, most important 
of all, secured loans from abroad. But his ambition grew 
apace and presently, as creator and head of China’s west- 
ernized army, he had garrisoned all the provinces under his 
lieutenants, and with secure military control he proceeded 
to spurn cabinet and parliament, and then to  seize the 
crown and create a dynasty. 
T w o  difficulties intervened. One was the fact that  a 
republican movement had come to  represent a real and 
widespread determination to  change the form of govern- 
ment. In  spite of the carefully arranged election which 
would place him on the throne by the will of the people, 
Yuan knew that he was grasping only an empty shell. T h e  
other difficulty was that Yuan had been compelled to  accept 
while the Western world was preoccupied with its own life 
and death struggle, the twenty-one demands presented by 
Japan. No Chinese official, however powerless to do other- 
wise, could be the vehicle for so great a degradation and 
expect t o  survive. Yuan realized that the crown was be- 
yond his reach and the rage and disappointment of his 
defeated ambition hurried him t o  his death in 1915. 
Fo r  the past dozen years developments in China have 
been many, but they all possess the same characteristics. 
T h e  history has been of one piece. Wi th  the head removed 
the military governors in the provinces simply took charge 
and each one acted according to  his discretion, ambition, and 
ability. Lesser chieftains followed the same course 
and conducted themselves in their own areas as did the 
tuchuns in the provincial capitals. I t  \vas inevitable that 
a contest would arise to  determine whose ambitions would 
triumph, and so China entered upon that program of cha- 
otic civil war which has continued to the present moment. 
Because of the spectacular character of all warlike activity, 
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a greatly exaggerated importance has been attached 
to  the doings of the militarists. T h e  emergence of the 
four or five so-called war lords who are now contending 
fo r  supremacy seems to  indicate that large areas have come 
under a coherent control, and tha t  the final outcome will 
represent the triumph of one or another party. This ex- 
pectation is, in my opinion, without a basis. Our observa- 
tions of similar conditions in Western countries provide no 
ground for  drawing similar conclusions. A dictatorship 
maintaining itself by armed force will prove impossible in 
China. T h e  only parties formed thus far are held together 
not by principle, but by self-interest. Adherence must 
carry benefits, and the price is collected by the threat of 
defection. China cannot be ruled by force alone, because in 
China force must be personally exerted, which means that 
its effective limits are narrow. 
If a general dictatorship could be established it would 
itself prove the greatest barrier to the establishment of 
civil government. T h e  tuchuns would continue as a t  pres- 
ent the sole agents of authority in the provinces. T h e  
local rule of these chiefs would continue as now, and with 
it the extortion which is ruining the country gentry and the 
city merchants. In other words a general dictatorship 
would consist of the same multitude of small dictatorships. 
Each would advance its interest by intrigue, combination 
and threat of revolt. T h e  use of soldiers would mean, as 
a t  the present, the appropriation of all public income to  
sustain the military machine. Deficiencies would continue 
to be supplied by pillage. It should be understood that 
this kind of control is unnecessary for any portion of the 
organized life of the Chinese people. If the whole thing 
would be swept away the country would be exactly as before 
only relieved of a terrible burden, 
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Military action as such has little o r  no importance in 
China. Great sweeping movements are carried out with 
little loss of blood except by the civilian population. One 
day’s fight on the western front killed more soldiers than 
a decade of civil war in China. T h e  mode of operation 
that brings success is to  secure the defection of enemies. 
T h e  Cantonese secured the Wuhan cities from W u  Pei-Fu 
because his most trusted general went over and delivered 
Hanyang. T h e  armies of Sun Chuang Fang were beaten, 
not by battle but by treachery. I t  is simply a very dramatic 
game for which the country has to pay. Armies aggre- 
gating a million are costly toys to  support. Nor  does it 
matter whether a particular place is occupied by one faction 
or another. T h e  newcomers simply drive out the odious 
and oppressive bandits as they call their predecessors, for 
which service they require the civilians to express substan- 
tial appreciation. Any idea that the political reconstruc- 
tion of China will be carried out by one o r  several of the 
war lords is illusory and absurd. 
This, however, is not the final account of the effect of 
military action. There  is an important sense in which mili- 
tary organization is father of the political state. I t  is not 
the result of battles or of conquest of territories that really 
counts; it is rather the holding of great numbers of men 
in a system which is the precise contrary of their traditional 
forms of organization. In  the West  the family system with 
its control by custom was broken by the detachment, 
through hundreds of years, of men fo r  service in the wars. 
Military organization means discipline, control by direct 
command and by regulation, combination in terms of in- 
dividuals and the planting of personal ambition as a motive 
of exertion. Men  become the units of organization in con- 
trast with families. Law comes to  be understood as a 
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development of regulation in contrast with custom. I n  
other words, military life is an education leading toward 
individual citizenship. This, I believe, is the proper 
assessment of the value of civil war in China. I t  is a por- 
tion of the curriculum of nations learning to  be republics. 
T h e  second important factor during the period since 
1915, is the student population of the universities and other 
schools. These, as already mentioned, have been impreg  
nated with Western conceptions, and most of them believe 
themselves to  have received a Western education. But in 
this matter the quality of scholarship hardly comes into 
question. T h e  students have constituted themselves a 
political factor because they provide the only widespread 
medium of public opinion in China. T h e  body of the people 
are not vocal, learning of any kind commands great respect, 
and newspapers, though multiplying rapidly, have but a lim- 
ited and personal influence. Through the student popula- 
tion, then, the waves of opinion are  propagated, with the 
lack of critical restraint to  be expected of schoolboys, and 
with a vehemence found always associated with youth. T h e  
actual method is that  of speechmaking, posting of placards, 
and organizing of demonstrations. In  other words, opin- 
ion moves as a form of mob action, and is never far  from 
advocacy of violence. 
When in 1919 it appeared that the Peace Conference 
would confirm the Japanese claim to inheritance of Ger- 
man interests in China, and America, the traditional friend, 
failed to  lend her protection, the student population rose 
in a nationwide protest. Those who had accepted the 
Japanese demands were driven into retirement, and a boy- 
cott o f  everything Japanese was initiated and carried 
through with such thoroughness as to  recover more ground 
than had been lost in the Conference. Japan discovered her- 
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self being more effectively barred from the continent than if 
held by restraint of armies and navies. I t  was an example 
of unanimity which makes one hesitate to  say that the 
Chinese are unable to undertake unified action. T h e  other 
convincing example was the extermination of the poppy, and 
elimination, not only of the trade in opium but of its use, 
carried out in a few years and by a tottering monarchy. 
T h e  successful boycott of Japan depended of course 
upon the response and cooperation of Chinese merchants, 
who since that time have not shown themselves amenable 
to  student leadership. I t  has, however, been possible to  
stir coolies into demonstrations which, because of their in- 
flammable nature, constitute a grave danger. T h e  students 
played their characteristic part  in the mob action that re- 
sulted in the unfortunate incidents of 1925 a t  Shanghai, 
Shameen, and Hankow. Through them, anti-foreign prop- 
aganda is carried on now under the skillful guidance of 
Russian agents. They have tried their hand a t  curbing the 
political action of the militarists, but merely succeeded in 
having a number of their demonstrators shot down by the 
soldiery. In general, student leadership in the past two 
years has so fa r  overplayed as to  discredit itself. This is 
healthy as a restraint upon the pretentious ambition of the 
students to  dominate China in all political matters. Public 
affairs in the hands of excited boys can hardly be conducted 
otherwise than foolishly. I n  the long run, however, the 
students will play an  important part  in the reconstruction 
of China. When the present generation matures and de- 
velops a sense of reality, they will provide an essential 
linkage between the leaders of the nation and the masses 
of the people. Their attention to  politics is now enor- 
mously exaggerated, but to have a generation of schoolboys 
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thinking about national affairs, however misguided that 
thinking may be, will in time prove a valuable asset. 
T h e  third great factor in the China of to-day, as of all 
previous periods, is the country gentry with whom may be 
associated the merchants in the towns and cities. These 
constitute what corresponds to  the middle class in western 
countries. But since China has no aristocracy they stand 
as the chief representatives of the life and work of the 
people. They  have never in the past concerned themselves 
with public affairs beyond the peaceful conduct of com- 
munity life and trade. I n  a national sense they are inactive 
and have not even become vocal. They  desire and expect, 
as in the past, that governmental affairs will somehow work 
themselves out to a conclusion. I t  matters little what, if 
it will save them from disturbance. H e r e  is the really 
powerful element in the Chinese population. Until they 
move it cannot be said that the events in China are more 
than a stirring of the surface. Thei r  policy is as always a 
patient waiting, expecting as always to  endure until con- 
ditions can become favorable. T h e  country gentry has 
suffered seriously a t  the hands of the militarists, the mer- 
chants in lesser degree since local trade has not been 
seriously impeded. T h e  gentry is not organized, but the 
merchants have their guilds and chambers of commerce, 
which are strong and influential. T h e  repeated levies for 
funds to  support the soldiery are slowly prodding this class 
into action. They  are now confused by political catch 
phrases and anti-foreign propaganda. When they arrive 
a t  the point of unloading the military burden, it is my 
opinion that this will be done effectively. I n  the long run 
China will probably develop a governmental machinery 
closely associated with the commercial organization of the 
country, as it is in this field that the Chinese have genera- 
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tions of practice in the conduct of extensive organization. 
T h e  central question respecting China is whether there 
has been any real and definite step toward orderly govern- 
ment of the Western type since the destruction of the Em- 
pire. T h e  answer is negative, in spite of pretensions t o  
republican forms, to  the establishment of courts and west- 
ern codes, to the acceptance of constitutional principles and 
the general claim that a westernized system is ready to  
function upon the cessation of civil war. T h e  republic 
exists in the minds of a handful of returned students. China 
as a whole has hardly a remote understanding of what it 
means. T h a t  all the events since 1911 have a relevance 
to  political change no one can doubt. A new nationhood 
will be born, of all these labor pains. But it is by way of 
preparation only, a plowing of the field for something not 
yet capable of definition. 
Republics, after all, are products of social-evolution. 
They are integral to  the whole Western scheme of things. 
T h a t  which resulted from a thousand years of European 
history cannot be lifted, transferred and adopted. I t  de- 
pends at  every moment of its existence upon the habits and 
attitudes of men and the usages of society. I t  was the 
development of a democratic society that effected the tran- 
sition from monarchial to republican forms. A govern- 
ment of this character is a tremendous instrument for  
gathering and applying the consensus of thought and the 
collective purposes of a prepared citizenship. But purposes 
which coordinate the activities of men, marshal them upon 
the road of progress and direct them toward a realization 
of social ideals, are  themselves rooted in the past. They 
bring forward and express all that  a people has been. I t  
is absurd to  think of a constitution as a mere instrument, 
a formal plan for  the operation of a government. Every- 
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one knows that the British constitution is a body of prin- 
ciples, never standing by themselves but embodied in all 
acts of legislation, building itself through centuries of 
national life. Our own constitution is infinitely more than 
a fixed plan. It, too, is a growth of controlling principles 
f rom the beginning of the republic, through more than a 
century of practical application to  circumstances as they 
have arisen in our development. Our social past gave these 
principles their first statement, and our national past deter- 
mines the direction in which future changes will take place. 
W e  need to  recover these elementary facts about the nature 
of government to  save ourselves from disappointment if 
we expect t o  see China display the reality of republicanism 
after a few years of turmoil. 
T h e  Chinese people are constituted as a clan society 
under a custom economy. T h e  only political organization 
they have ever had, and indeed the only one possible so 
long as that type of society persists, is a personal system 
acting through a hierarchy of deputed authority. T h e  rul- 
ers have naturally always been conquerors, either domestic 
o r  foreign. The  fundamental difference between China and 
the West  is that the latter, after conquest, developed feu- 
dalism, a system which made the absorption of custom 
control into legal control a matter only of time. T h e  rulers 
of China spread a thin fabric over the vast cultured popu- 
lation without in any way disturbing the domination of 
custom. As already stated, the officials were not primarily 
administrators but distinguished exponents of the ethical 
system. Hence the solidarity, durability, and independence 
of Chinese civilization. 
If what has already been said regarding constitutional- 
ism is kept in mind, it will be realized that China in accept- 
ing a rigime of this type will be making use merely of the 
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forms in which government is cast, while her real consti- 
tution will express her own past. This  has transpired in 
other countries. Argentina provides a good example in the 
use made since independence of republican forms, back of 
which operated native principles and concepts. More  than 
half a century elapsed before form and principle began to  
come into accordance. Whether Western governmental 
forms could serve as vehicles for the real Chinese consti- 
tution is a matter of doubt before the experiment is tried. 
So f a r  they have promptly gone to  pieces. 
T h e  reports persistently promulgated in this country re- 
garding the advances in westernization of the Chinese, 
have to  be taken with a grain of salt. A few thousand 
students do not represent the Chinese people, and the west- 
ernization of these students is, with the majority, a very 
superficial affair. I t  must be kept in mind that Chinese life 
is what it has been for many centuries, and that it has no 
proper comparison with organized life in the West. 
Wi th  all government broken down, with military control 
universal, with every leader practising his own method of 
extortion, with a court system that is a farce, Chinese life, 
short of conditions of siege o r  massacre, treats all these 
things as minor disturbances. T h e  processes of govern- 
ment have always been separate from this organized life, 
and left absolutely to  those who happened to  operate them. 
When an official became too oppressive the people rose in 
some kind of revolt, which was usually taken by the central 
government as an indication that its official was a t  fault. 
There  could be no more profound misconception than that 
the Chinese people have been stirred to  political conscious- 
ness, or that  they have very much to  do with what is 
happening in China. Class-conscious labor organizations 
are naturally to be found in the foreign concessions where 
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factories operate, and where agitators can apply a lesson of 
organization learned in the West. But this is a mere drop 
in the sea of the working Chinese population. 
As  a matter of fact, the nearest approach to  Chinese con- 
ditions found in our own history displayed itself during the 
fifteenth century. A t  that time the merchant craftsman with 
his guild organization was almost a precise counterpart of 
the present-day Chinese merchant. But in the West  even 
five centuries ago, the family system was already undergoing 
disintegration, whereas in China the clan has as yet hardly 
been touched. In the West  the various stages of develop- 
ment were passed with a speed that meant continuous re- 
adjustment from absolute monarchy to  the democratic 
republic. T o  ask the Chinese to  lift themselves through 
all the stages of five centuries in a few years, is to  voice an 
impossible expectation, especially in view of the tenacity 
of their family system. A clan-custom economy precedes 
political organization, and has to  give way before any 
organic state can be formed. There  is no such linkage 
between state and family as was to  be found in the 
feudalism of the West. Only an empire could maintain 
itself in China and this by a rigid non-interference with 
cus tom-con trol. 
In  the West  the center of gravity shifted so long ago 
from private to public relationships and functions that we 
take this to  be normal with all mankind. But in fact 
the Chinese are now a distance from us represented by,the 
whole of Western political history. Moreover, such ma- 
chinery of authority as constituted for them the state system 
has been completely disrupted and beyond hope of reestab- 
lishment. T h e  bandit chief occupying a Chinese town is 
simply and absohtely the type of government that China 
possesses. 
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Naturally, there is in China no such thing as public inter- 
est. There  can only be a concurrence of private interests. 
With' few exceptions the Chinese official is so utterly cor- 
rupt that he is incapable of understanding a public trust. 
I t  is not the kind of corruption that we know, in which the 
practitioner is aware that he is bad, and is sooner or later 
made to  feel the consequences. In  the Chinese system 
corruption is a factor in goodness. A man's primary loyalty 
is to his family. H e  is therefore entirely justified in plun- 
dering public office for private benefit. In fact any other 
conduct would be considered undutiful. If a man is not a 
knave in any public capacity he is considered a fool for not 
being one if he has the opportunity. 
For  the same reason the corporate organization of busi- 
ness is a t  present unworkable in China away from foreign 
protection in the concessions. I had occasion to  study the 
organization and operation of two large Chinese-owned 
cotton mills. They  were on their way to  failure, being 
plundered by everyone from the coolies who stole the yarn 
to  the directors who stole the dividends. This same account 
is true of the one Chinese-owned transport company which 
operates on a large scale. I t s  chief element of permanence 
is the mortgage of its properties to  the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
Regarding the outlook, there can be no discounting the 
forces pressing China to refashion herself on the Western 
model. These forces are mostly economic. T rade  rela- 
tions that under the old system were local and personal 
have become national or a t  least regional, and impersonal. 
Prosperity depends upon the exchange of goods over wide 
areas with the advantages of specialized production where 
such production is most advantageous. When it is easier to  
ship wheat from the United States to  the mills in Hankow 
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than to  bring it in from the province of Shansi, the Chinese 
have a practical object lesson in commercial organization 
which they are not failing to  learn. When machine-made 
goods from abroad can be purchased more cheaply than 
from the local craftsman, there is practical reason for study- 
ing the basis of prosperity. With four-fifths of the popu- 
lation a t  an economic level no higher than what we call 
the poverty line, there is a pressing motive to  improve the 
general welfare. These are the forces making for change 
in China and they have nothing to  do with the issues raised 
against foreigners. As a matter of fact the only prosperous 
Chinese are  those who depend upon foreign protection in 
the concessions. These cities are. object lessons to  the 
Chinese, not of imperialistic oppression, but of the world’s 
new economic organization. 
In  the efforts to  work out what is purely a domestic 
problem the Chinese have adopted a method which is not 
altogether novel in their history, that of stimulating and 
capitalizing resentment. This  is likely to divert attention 
from the real issues, is likely to  provoke its own reaction 
and may produce difficult complications. A t  the present 
time Westerners are  being held to blame for all of China’s 
difficulties. Resentment, organized and focused against 
the foreigner, constitutes what is called the Nationalist 
Movement. I t  fixes upon the “unequal treaties”, extra- 
territoriality, the concessions and customs control. I t  is 
claimed that these have produced the confusion in China, 
a claim which is entirely incorrect. Every demand could 
be granted, even to  the expulsion of all foreigners and con- 
fiscation of their property, without altering for the better in 
any degree the political situation of the Chinese. T h e  anti- 
foreign movement is precisely similar to  that of the Boxer 
uprising, and will probably express itself in the same way. 
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As a matter of fact nothing would better suit the pur- 
poses of the United States and Great Britain than to  have 
the Chinese nation quickly find a stable political basis and 
an adequate administrative system. If and when this is 
done, the so-called “unequal treaties” will take care of 
themselves automatically, in the same manner as they did in 
Japan. There  is no virtue in maintaining extraterritorial- 
ity or the independence of the concession cities o r  supervi- 
sion of the customs, merely for their own sake. As soon as 
these matters can be handled by the Chinese in a manner 
to insure the rights of foreigners, every measure of foreign 
control will be gladly relinquished. T h e  one great hope is 
the attainment of a stability which carries independence and 
with it the results indicated, in a reasonable length of time. 
From what source then can China secure a governmental 
fabric which will replace chaos with some measure of co- 
ordination? For  several years, step by step, Russia has 
been preparing to  supply this need. There  is no question 
that the Russian has many qualifications for the task. H e  
is sufficiently oriental t o  handle the Chinese in Chinese 
terms, T h e  assertion of authority will probably not come 
out of Canton. T h e  Russians are merely preparing the 
way through the Cantonese for a possible real assertion of 
control through Mongolia and Manchuria where the edge 
of the knife can be supported by the back. T h e  first diffi- 
culty in its way is that a conflict with Japan will become 
inevitable. 
T h e  fact that soon became clear to me through my in- 
quiries in China, was that the Russian policy is to-day pre- 
cisely what it was a generation ago, that is, to  obtain a 
secure, if not dominant position on the Pacific seaboard. 
Russia has led the world to  believe that her activities are 
inspired by her conception of a new social order. W e  have 
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allowed ourselves through panic in connection with these 
teachings, to  be deluded by what is merely a smoke screen. 
I t  is the old and fundamental expansion policy of Russia, and 
not the theory of the Thi rd  International, that is in opera- 
tion in the F a r  East. There  is no particular effort t o  teach 
communism, the very thought of which in China is absurd. 
But it does supply catch words, such as “capitalism” and 
“imperialism” which are tools for inflaming normal resent- 
ment and focusing it against any chosen one of the Western 
powers. When the time comes and under the guise of sup- 
porting a Chinese faction, such possibly as that of Feng 
Yu Hsiang, the Russians may assert administrative control, 
and by the screened injection of Russian detachments be 
able to  carry out effective military action. 
While present conditions last, no proposal from Western 
powers except t o  relinquish their treaty rights, will be ac- 
ceptable to  the Chinese. But in the long run problems of 
this kind are solved on a basis of fact rather than that of 
propaganda. I t  is true that both Russia and Japan menace 
the integrity of China, as both have a territorial footing 
f rom which to  carry out aggressive measures. T h e  Western 
powers have their trade interests and their investments 
which can only prove valuable with friendly relationships 
and mutual profit. If, therefore, the Chinese should desire 
assistance from outside to  reorganize their national affairs, 
they would be wise to  seek o r  accept it from Western 
powers. 
The re  is possibly an insuperable difficulty in the universal 
connection between government and national pride. I t  
seems humiliating to  accept guidance, not to  mention con- 
trol, by foreigners. Patriotism always insists upon self- 
government. This again should be regarded purely as a mat- 
ter of business in which the Chinese possess as a people, a 
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more practical judgment than any other. In  the first place, 
that of which China has reason to  be proud, is her life and 
culture, and these have fa r  less relation to  governmental 
mechanics than elsewhere. In  the next place, if the Chinese 
were able to  conduct affairs of the western type with the 
effectiveness of Westerners, they would already have lost 
the peculiar virtues and distinctive qualities upon which their 
new place in the world is to  depend. When an industrial 
plant is established and operated, it is not felt to  be a humil- 
iation to  employ a skilled foreign manager, to train and 
organize the native employees. I t  would be foolish to  re- 
sent that arrangement since no other would bring the results 
desired. 
For  over two generations the Maritime Customs depart- 
ment has been conducted by a foreigner working as an of- 
ficial of the Chinese government. As a piece of adminis- 
tration, the Chinese know that this has been effective, 
honest, and a reason for pride. T h e  clamor of politicians 
to  be given the place of foreign experts should be taken 
a t  the real value of all pr.etensions by politicians. 
W h a t  then could be done in cooperation with the Western 
powers to  provide a few simple but solid administrative 
arrangements needed to  carry on a central government? 
T h e  answer is to  follow the precedent of the Maritime 
Customs and establish an administrative council to  head a 
civil service which would quickly become exclusively Chinese. 
T h e  arrangement should be limited to  a period of years and 
renewed if desired. Such a council should represent a real 
cooperation between the Chinese and Western governments, 
I t  should be the next stage of treaty revision with power 
to  effect modification of extraterritorial privileges, control 
of the concessions, adjustment of the tariff rates, and all 
diplomatic authority over the national income. A half 
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dozen men of the type of Sir Robert H a r t ,  supported by 
the Chinese and backed by a concert of powers that are 
party to  the treaties, appointed for  a period of fifteen years 
t o  train and guide a Chinese administrative personnel, would 
go far  toward placing China in the forefront of the family 
of nations. 
Naturally the foregoing suggestion cannot commend itself 
to  the inflamed type of patriotism now rampant among the 
politicians, schoolboys, and concession coolies. I t  would 
however be appreciated by the gentry and the merchants. 
T h e  point will be reached presently when these real factors 
in the life of China grow tired of chaos that ruins business, 
and of extortion that impoverishes civilians, and assert their 
will in public affairs, 
T h e  kind of management described would naturally have 
only a temporary usefulness to  give self-government a 
chance to  grow. This  development must certainly begin 
with the people themselves, not the masses but the selected 
individuals. There  is in China, which for the most par t  
lives in village communities, a well operating method of 
self-government through the village elders, known as the 
country gentry. These are heads of families but not sepa- 
rated from the people by any class distinction. Imperial 
officials always dealt with the people through these elders. 
They are persons of influence who have the settling of 
nearly all disputes and see that village affairs are  conducted 
in an orderly manner as defined by custom. It is my opinion 
that representative government must make its beginning in 
the villages, expand to areas not too large for  the personal 
character and influence of the gentry to  be lost to  view, and 
then develop into representative provincial government. 
China must in the end be a federation of provinces on a 
system of representation which should, for  a long time, be 
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as simple as possible. T h e  federal jurisdiction should be as 
circumscribed as was our own a t  the beginning. T h e  na- 
tional government should insure the keeping of order, main- 
tain courts of federal jurisdiction, assist education by grants 
in aid, establish a currency and credit system, own and oper- 
ate railway transportation and the basic industries of coal 
and iron. 
These are matters of straightforward governmental me- 
chanics similar to  the administration of the Maritime Cus- 
toms. Legislative functions are so utterly foreign to  the 
Chinese that they should be kept to  the minimum for a long 
time. A small legislative council representing the provinces 
and including a cabinet of administrative heads would sup- 
ply all needs. 
In  the end, a government can do  no more than register 
and enforce such general agreements as a people may need 
to facilitate their own cooperative efforts. A government is 
merely a tool by which a people applies the regulations of 
the game of national life. Often its best service is that of 
removing obstructions from the path of the collective pur- 
pose. So far, in other countries no form of government has 
created a national life, o r  brought prosperity, or accom- 
plished any of the magical results that have been wished. 
I t  is natural that  China, involved in the circumstances of 
effecting a change, should imagine that all good things can 
be made to  flow from a wise and powerful central authority. 
There  is no basis in history for this expectation. National 
achievement rests with a people, and not with a government. 
No people have proved this in a more impressive manner 
by their past than have the Chinese. Some day Chinese 
leadership may produce a genius who realizes how very little 
government China needs. A t  that point she will have mas- 
tered the first and greatest of all political lessons, 
